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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the debate in recent years surrounding genetically modified
organisms (GMO) has centered on the creation of a formal protocol for
regulating the transboundary movement of GMOs as well as what prod-
ucts or processes would be included in the definition of "GMO."' One
issue which has become increasingly important in regulating the trans-
boundary movement of GMOs is how states assess the dangers
associated with GMOs in making regulatory decisions. GMOs are an
extremely divisive issue primarily because of the difficulty of assessing
the risks associated with GMOs to human health and the environment.
Recently, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex Commission)
adopted new standards for assessing risks associated with foods derived
from modem biotechnology (Codex guidelines). 2 These standards repre-
sent a new baseline for international measures regulating GMOs and will
play a significant part in adjudicating international disputes involving
assessing risks associated with GMOs, particularly in the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
The current dispute brought by the United States in the WTO against
the European Community's (E.C.) de facto moratorium on the importa-
tion of GMOs has substantial implications for future risk assessment of
1. The debate originally centered around the formation of the Cartagena Biosafety
Protocol (CPB) which creates a framework for the regulation of transboundary GMO ship-
ments. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan.
29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol]. Within the discussions surround the
CPB, there was disagreement about whether to regulate only those GMOs which were delib-
erately released into the environment such as seeds or whether it would apply to all
commodities made with GMOs. See, e.g., BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest (March 1,
1999), at http://www.ictsd.org/html/storyl.01-03-99.htm. This debate was largely outside the
context of WTO measures.
For an analysis of the WTO measures and their relationship to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, see Barbara Eggers & Ruth Mackenzie, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 3 J.
INT'L EcON. L. 525 (2002). See also Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving
Regulatory Strategy for GMOs-The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine,
24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 317, 353 (2000) (assessing the application of the Biosafety Protocol
and the SPS Agreement); Terence P Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the
Environment: The Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS
Agreement of the World Trade Organization, 14 COLO. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2003) (discuss-
ing the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol as an emerging norm of customary international law).
2. Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 03/41, Twenty-sixth Session, FAO
Headquarters, Rome Report at 52 (June 30-July 7, 2003). The Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion is an intergovernmental body established by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
and the World Health Organization whose mission is to set international health standards.
[Vol. 25:813
The New Codex Alimentarious
GMOs in connection with trade related measures. For the purposes of
this Note, the most significant part of the U.S. claim centers around the
E.C.'s alleged violations of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement).' Since measures found to "conform to"
standard promulgated by the Codex Alimentarius Commission enjoy a
presumption of compliance with the SPS Agreement as well as the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the new Codex
Commission standards for biotechnology will play a key role in the
WTO dispute.
The E.C. has had three significant measures designed to regulate
GMOs. The first, Directive 90/219/EEC was the original instrument for
regulating GMOs in the E.C. Directive 90/219/EEC sought to regulate
the contained use of genetically modified organisms for research and
industrial purposes.6 It was supplemented by Directive 90/220/EEC
which regulated the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment or
onto the market. In the face of rapid development of scientific knowl-
edge and new information on GMOs generally,8 the E.C. repealed
Directive 90/220 in 2001 and replaced it with Council Directive
3. See European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Aug. 8, 2003,
WTO Doc. VT/DS291/23.
4. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex I(A), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27,
at 21,895 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. It is important to
point out that measures which seek a higher level of protection than that deemed appropriate
by the international standard are not deemed to "conform to" that standard and instead must
be justified with scientific evidence as well as be shown to comply with SPS Article 5. Id. art.
3, at 21,896-97.
5. Council Directive 90/219/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the contained use of genetically
modified micro-organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 1.
6. Press Release, European Commission, Facts on GMOs in the EU, MEMO/00/43 1
(July 13, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/00/43&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited July
26, 2004).
7. Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of
Genetically Modified Organisms, Part B, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15, 18 [hereinafter Directive
90/220]; see also id.
8. Report on the joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee for a European
Parliament and Council directive on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically
modified organisms and repealing Directive 90/220/EEC, Eur. Parl. Doc. (A5-0032/2001) 6
(2001), available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+
REPORT+A5-2001-0032+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y
(last visited July 26, 2004).
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2001/18/EEC, commonly known as the "Deliberate Release Directive.'" 9
One of the major differences between Directive 90/220 and the Deliber-
ate Release Directive is the Deliberate Release Directive's requirement
that a GMO applicant consult with scientific authorities in the decision
making process.l0
Like the previous directive it replaces, the Deliberate Release Direc-
tive has notification requirements for parties seeking to move GMOs
across borders, both for when the GMO is going to be released into the
environment (e.g., seeds) or placed on the market (e.g., commodities)."
In addition, the releasing party must also submit an environmental risk
assessment (ERA).'2 The ERA should, "in accordance with the precau-
tionary principle," compare the characteristics of the GMO and its non-
modified counterpart, using a "scientifically sound and transparent man-
ner based on available scientific and technical data," with the purpose of
"identifying if there is a need for risk management and if so, the most
appropriate methods to be used.'
3
The Deliberate Release Directive also contains a provision for dif-
ferentiated procedures where there is sufficient knowledge about or
experience with the release of GMOs in certain ecosystems. This "fast
track" decision making process only requires a minimum amount of
9. Council Directive 2001/18/EEC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of
Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/E.C., art. 4(1), 2001
O.J. (L 106) 1, 5 [hereinafter Directive 2001/18].
10. Id. art. 28(1), at 14. More specifically, the directive states that when a competent
authority in the European Commission (Commission) raises objections regarding the risks of
GMOs "to human health or to the environment", the Commission shall consult a "relevant
Scientific Committee." In addition, the Commission may also consult a scientific committee
"on any matter under [Directive 2001/18] that may have an adverse effect on human health
and the environment." Id. art. 28(l)-(2), at 14-15.
11. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, arts. 6(1), 13(1), at 6-7, 9. This notification con-
sists of a technical dossier containing information about the GMO, including its release into
and interactions with, the environment, and a plan for monitoring effects of GMOs on human
health and the environment. The Deliberate Release Directive requires that for GMOs placed
on the market (commodities), the releasing party also have a provide a proposal for labeling
the produce. Id. art. 13(2)(f), at 9. For an overview of the compatibility of the E.C.'s labeling
requirements with WTO agreements, see Brian Schwartz, Note, WTO and GMOs: Analyzing
the European Community's Recent Regulations Covering the Labeling of Genetically Modified
Organisms, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 771 (2004).
12. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, annex II, § A, at 19. The objective of the ERA is
"on a case by case basis, to identify and evaluate potential adverse effects of the GMO, either
direct and indirect, immediate or delayed, on human health and the environment which the
deliberate release or placing on the market may have." Id.
13. Id. annex II, §§ A, B, at 19-20. Directive 2001/18 also requires consideration of the
Precautionary Principle when implementing the directive in its entirety. Id. pmbl., at 19.
14. Id. art. 7, at 7. Note that this provision applies only to GMOs other than those being
released onto the market. See id. art. 1, at 4.
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technical information to evaluate any foreseeable risks. Finally, the De-
liberate Release Directive requires in both the preamble and Article 1
entitled "Objective" that all actions be taken "in accordance with the
precautionary principle."'6
The new Codex guidelines do not require consideration of the Pre-
cautionary Principle, indeed they do not mention it anywhere. This is
problematic in that if the Precautionary Principle is deemed to allow the
Deliberate Release Directive to have a higher level of protection than
that prescribed by the Codex guidelines, then it will not enjoy a pre-
sumption of compliance with the SPS Agreement and will have to by
analyzed under the SPS Agreement in total. Despite the fact that the Pre-
cautionary Principle is not actually mentioned in the Codex guidelines,
in making the determination of whether the Deliberate Release Directive
conforms to the Codex guidelines for the purposes of the SPS Agree-
ment, the key consideration is whether or not the Precautionary Principle
can be read into the Codex guidelines, in a sense recognizing an embed-
ded precautionary principle. If it can, then the Deliberate Release
Directive can be read to conform to the Codex guidelines, thereby enjoy-
ing a presumption of compliance with both the SPS Agreement and the
GAT. This question will be the primary focus of Part III and IV.
If the Codex guidelines cannot be read to contain a functional pre-
cautionary principle, the Deliberate Release Directive will indeed seek a
higher level of protection and will have to be judged for compliance with
the entire SPS Agreement independent of any comparison with the Co-
dex guidelines. This analysis will be done in Part V.
This Note makes two assertions. First, despite the fact that the Co-
dex guidelines do not specifically invoke the Precautionary Principle in
name, it can indeed be read into the guidelines in the amount of defer-
ence given to states in how they assess risk. This in turn means that the
E.C.'s Deliberate Release Directive should be enjoy a presumption of
compliance with both the SPS Agreement and the GATT. The second
assertion is that even if the adjudicating body of the WTO finds that the
Deliberate Release Directive, in relying on the Precautionary Principle,
prescribes a higher level of protection than the Codex guidelines allow
for, it still complies with the SPS Agreement and the GATT in its own
right.
15. See id. art. 7(3), at 7. To qualify for the streamlined procedure, the biology of the
non-modified organism must be well known and safe for human consumption and interactions
with the receiving environment. Id. at annex V, at 34. Additionally, there must be well charac-
terized information about deleted or inserted genetic material. Id. The GMO must not present
any additional or increased risks to human health. Id.
16. Id. art. 1, at 4.
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Part H provides an overview of the Codex guidelines and establishes
why the Deliberate Release Directive should be considered under the
Codex guidelines and not an alternative standard. Part III will look at
whether generally the Codex guidelines and the Deliberate Release Di-
rective seek the same level of protection in risk assessment procedures.
This analysis will be important in determining whether the Deliberate
Release Directive "conforms to" the Codex guidelines for the purposes
of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement." Part IV looks at how precaution as a
principle is used in both instruments. Specifically, Part IV establishes
that although the Precautionary Principle is explicitly invoked in the De-
liberate Release Directive, but is not in the Codex guidelines, the two
instruments still generally seek the same level of protection because the
Codex guidelines contains elements of precaution. Part V assumes, ar-
guendo, that a WTO panel would find that the Deliberate Release
Directive seeks a higher level of protection than required by the Codex
guidelines. In this case, Part V establishes that even if the Deliberate Re-
lease Directive does seek a higher level of protection and therefore does
not enjoy a presumption of compatibility with the SPS Agreement, it still
complies with the SPS Agreement overall.
II. THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD:
THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
The Codex Alimentarius Commission held its 26th session in Rome
in July of 2003. At the session, the Commission adopted four standards
for assessing the risks to consumers from food derived from GMOs: 1)
the Draft Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Mod-
em Biotechnology; 2) the Draft Guideline for the Conduct of Food
Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from Recombinant-DNA Plants; 3)
the Draft Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Re-
combinant-DNA Microorganisms; and 4) the Proposed Draft Annex on
Possible Allergenicity Assessment.'8
A. The Primary Elements of the New Codex Standards for GMOs
The centerpiece of the new Codex guidelines, the Draft Principles
for the Risk Analysis of Food Derived from Modern Biotechnology (Co-
dex guidelines), generally requires a risk assessment, risk management,
17. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3, at 21,896-97.
18. Supra note 2. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "Genetically Modified Food",
"GM foods", "GMOs" and "Food Derived from Modern Biotechnology" to be synonymous.
[Vol. 25:813
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risk communication, information exchange and a review process. 9 The
safety assessment guidelines for food derived from GM plants and mi-
croorganisms serve as complementary pieces, filling out requirements
for risk assessments.20
The Codex guidelines are a procedural framework." While the
guidelines require that risk management be proportional to the assessed
risk, they do not define risk in the normative sense, but only offer proce-
dure for assessing risk 2
The risk assessment is to be based on a safety assessment, designed
to identify a hazard.23 The safety assessment is not meant to assess abso-
lute risk, but rather relative risk in relation to a conventional
counterpart.24 This method, called substantial equivalence, has benefits
over traditional methods of using animal models to determine absolute
risk.2 ' The comparison of the GM food to its conventional counterpart
serves to demonstrate risks which animal models may not reveal, primar-
ily because the substance to be tested in animal studies is well isolated
and is not likely to reveal the kind of risks associated with whole foods.26
19. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the Third Session of the Codex Ad Hoc
Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, app. II, ALINORM
03/34 (June 30-July 5, 2003) [hereinafter Task Force Report].
20. Id. app. III(V).
21. Id. app. II, 2.
22. Id. 16.
23. Id. 10.
24. See id. apps. III, IV.
25. Id. app. I1, 12; see Safety Aspects of Genetically Modified Foods of Plant Origin,
Report of a Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultations on Foods Derived from Biotechnology,
WHO doc. WHO/SDE/PHE/FOS/00.6 (May 29-June 2, 2000) (describing the concept of
substantial equivalence); Commission Recommendation 97/618/E.C. of 29 July 1997 (con-
cerning the scientific aspects and the presentation of information necessary to support
applications for the placing on the market of novel foods and novel food ingredients and the
preparation of initial assessment reports under Regulation (E.C.) No. 258/97 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 1997 O.J. (L 253) 1, 1-36). The regulation stated:
The concept of substantial equivalence has been introduced by WHO (the World
Health Organisation) and OE.C.D (the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development) with particular reference to foods produced by modem biotechnol-
ogy. In the terminology of the OE.C.D, the concept of substantial equivalence
embodies the idea that existing organisms used as foods or as food sources can
serve as a basis for comparison when assessing the safety of human consumption of
a food or food component that has been modified or is new. If a new food or food
component is found to be substantially equivalent to an existing food or food com-
ponent, it can be treated in the same manner with respect to safety, keeping in mind
that establishment of substantial equivalence is not a safety or nutritional assess-
ment in itself, but an approach to compare a potential new food with its
conventional counterpart.
Id.
26. Task Force Report, supra note 19, app. III, IN 10, 11.
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However, the guidelines make clear that substantial equivalence is only a
starting point for analysis. It is not intended to imply absolute safety but
rather to demonstrate the safety of the GM organism "relative to its con-
ventional counterpart."27
The expressed goal of the safety assessment is to "provide assur-
ance, in the light of the best available scientific knowledge, that the food
does not cause harm when prepared, used and/or eaten according to its
intended use."28 The risk assessment should also enable risk managers to
determine if any protective measures are needed and to make well-
informed decisions based on that need.29
In addition, the Codex guidelines require risk assessment be done on
a case by case basis and focus on the safety and nutritional aspects of
foods derived from modem biotechnology.3 ° The guidelines leave the
regulating party discretion to define a level of safety and nutritional as-
pects, however the risk assessment should be limited only to risks to
human health and wellbeing.3'
The Codex guidelines also require risk management measures taken
in response to risk assessment to be "proportional to the risk assess-
,,32ment. Responses may come in multiple forms, including labeling
requirements or marketing approvals.33 The guidelines specify that dif-
ferent measures which achieve the same level of protection should be
considered equivalent. 4 The guidelines also specify that risk managers
should implement "appropriate measures" to manage uncertainties iden-
tified in the risk assessment.35
The third set of elements, risk communication, involves public
transparency in the safety assessment and risk management decision-
making processes." This includes a "responsive consultation process"
where all reports prepared on safety assessments and other aspects of
decision making should be made available to all interested parties.37 In
addition, the consultation process also provides for an input mechanisms
27. Id. app. 1I, 13.
28. Id. T 21.
29. Id.
30. Id. app. II, 7.
3 1. Indeed, the risk assessment is not to take into account "environmental, ethical,
moral and socio-economic aspects." Id.
32. Id. app., 16.
33. Id. app., 16, 19.
34. Id. app. 1l, T 17.
35. Id. T 18.
36. Id. 23.
37. Id.
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whereby the views of all interested parties should be sought.38 This im-
plies a public participation element to the risk analysis.
Finally, the Codex guidelines state that regulatory authorities should
facilitate "the exchange of information including the information on ana-
lytical methods."3 9 Additionally, the guidelines require review of safety
assessments "in light of new scientific information that calls into ques-
tion the conclusion of the original safety assessment. ' 40 Implicit in this is
an understanding that review should be done whenever new significant
scientific data becomes available. This requirement in many ways mir-
rors the reasoning behind the E.C.'s creation of the Deliberate Release
Directive-to keep up with the development of scientific knowledge.4'
Therefore, in making this requirement, the Codex Commission ensures
that the Codex guidelines will keep pace with changes in domestic legis-
lation without needing amendments to the guidelines themselves.
B. The E.C. Measures Should Be Judged Under
the New Codex Guidelines
International organizations' participation in WTO disputes is varied.
In many instances, international organizations, particularly non-
governmental organizations, are limited in their input to submitting
amicus curiae briefs, with questionable efficacy. 2 However, there are a
few international organizations which enjoy a great deference from
WTO adjudicating bodies because they have been specified in various
WTO agreements as being authorities in specific areas. Among these are
the International Office of Epizootics, the Secretariat of the International
Plant Protection Convention, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.43
The Codex Commission is specifically listed in the SPS Agreement
as a "relevant international organization." Therefore, in terms of creat-
ing a measure which regulates food safety under the SPS Agreement, the
Codex guidelines on biotechnology represent a baseline procedural re-
quirement for assessing risks associated with GMOs.45
Although it is likely that the new Codex guidelines will apply in the
current dispute, there is a prima facie issue of timing with respect to the
38. Id. 24.
39. Id. 128.
40. Id. app. III, 59.
41. See European Parliament Session Document, supra note 8.
42. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 66 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the decision by the WTO panel in Shrimp Turtle
to not accept input from third parties as being inconsistent with Article 11 of the GATT).
43. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, annex A, at 21,903--04.
44. Id. art. 3(4), at 21897.
45. VED P. NANDA & GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POL-
ICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 372 (2003).
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Deliberate Release Directive and the Codex guidelines. Since the new
Codex guidelines were created after the Deliberate Release Directive, it
would have been impossible for the E.C. to consider them in drafting its
regulations.4 In the context of U.S. domestic jurisprudence, considering
the Deliberate Release Directive under guidelines which did not exist at
the time the directives were drafted would amount to creating retroactive
legislation, a practice generally frowned upon by U.S. courts. 7 This,
however, is not necessarily the case in WTO jurisprudence.
European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines (Sardines)
involved such a retroactive application of international standards. 8 In
Sardines, the E.C. argued that a regulation should not be considered un-
der international standards which did not exist at the time the regulation
was adopted.49 The Panel in Sardines did not agree with the E.C.'s argu-
ment, holding that any regulation which still exists at the time of the
adoption of a new international standard is bound to comply with that
new standard. ° The Panel reasoned that, under Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), a regulation
does not cease to exist before the new international standard is released,
and therefore it may be considered under that new standard."'
Sardines dealt specifically with claims made under the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) which requires that
international standards, where available, be followed 2 While the SPS
Agreement does not mandate such compliance,53 the reasoning behind
the Panel's finding in Sardines regarding the TBT Agreement also ap-
plies to the SPS Agreement.
More specifically, the relevant language in the SPS Agreement reads:
"[m]embers shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on inter-
national standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist."
' '
This requirement does not include any language indicating when a mem-
46. The Deliberate Release Directive was created in 2001, the Codex guidelines were
created in 2003.
47. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (stating that the
burden for retroactive legislation for showing constitutionality under the Due Process clause is
greater than for prospective legislation).
48. European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, May 29, 2002, WTO Doc.
WT/DS231/R.
49. See id.
50. Sardines, supra note 48, 7.74, (referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 28, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339).
51. Id. The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties states that a treaty is not retroac-
tive when the situation it governs has ceased to exist before the treaty entered into force.
52. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 1A, art. 2.4, WTO Agree-
ment, supra note 4, vol. 27, at 22053 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
53. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3(1) at 21,896.
54. Id.
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ber may consider international standards, only that the relevant interna-
tional standards, where they exist, be followed.5
Using the reasoning from Sardines and Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention, since the Deliberate Release Directive continue to exist after
the new Codex guidelines have been adopted, a WTO panel should judge
it under the new Codex guidelines.
III. E.C. COMPLIANCE WITH THE CODEX GUIDELINES
UNDER THE SPS AGREEMENT
The SPS Agreement applies to sanitary and phytosanitary measures
which "affect international trade.5 6 Since the Deliberate Release Direc-
tive seeks to regulate the transboundary movement of products, the
Directive falls under the auspices of the SPS Agreement and the WTO in
general. Of all the types of measures outlined in the definition of "sani-
tary or phytosanitary measure" in Annex A of the SPS, the Deliberate
Release Directive most likely would be considered under subparagraph
(a), a measure protecting against "risks ... of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease causing organisms" or subparagraph (c), a
measure designed "to protect human life or health within the territory of
the member from risks arising ... from the entry, establishment or
spread of pests.5 7 Since a WTO dispute has never involved GMOs, it is
not clear whether they would be considered pests, disease causing organ-
isms or disease carrying organisms." Nevertheless, in as much as a
GMO can rightly be considered a pest or disease causing organism, the
measures should be considered under the SPS agreement.59
Under the SPS Agreement, a member can either create measures
which "conform to international standards, guidelines or recommenda-
tions" or create their own measures, so long as they result in a "higher
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection" than the international
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. annex A(1), at 21,903 (emphasis added).
58. GMOs were briefly mentioned in WTO Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products, Oct. 27, 1998, DSR 1999:1 315, 442, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R, 8.36.
This case dealt with Japan's Plant Protection Law which banned certain plants and plant prod-
ucts from being imported on the grounds that they were potential hosts of codling moth, a pest
not found in Japan. GMOs were briefly mentioned in testimony in the panel report saying that
genetic modification can lead to differences in plant varieties.
59. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 350 (assessing the risks associated with
GMOs); see also Julie Teel, Rapporteur's Summary of the Deliberative Forum: Have NGO's
Distorted or Illuminated the Benefits and Hazards of Genetically Modified Organisms?, 13
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 140 (2002) (discussing the problems associated with
NGO's exaggeration of the risks of GMOs).
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standard. 6° If a member follows international standards in creating its
measure, there is a presumption that the measure will be consistent with
the SPS and the GATT 1994.6 If a member chooses to create a measure
which seeks a higher level of protection than the international standard,
it must conduct a risk assessment and justify the more stringent protec-
62tion on scientific grounds.
As stated above, the Codex Commission is specifically listed in the
SPS Agreement as a "relevant international organization" meaning that it
is a source for international standards. 63 Therefore, the Codex guidelines
for biotechnology represent a baseline for risk assessment of GMOs un-
der the SPS agreement.64
Furthermore, the Deliberate Release Directive would enjoy a pre-
sumption of compliance with the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994 if
it can be shown to "conform to" international standards, in this case the
Codex Commissions newly adopted standards for foods derived from
biotechnology.65 The Appellate Body in European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products ("Hormones") deter-
mined that for a measure to "conform[] to" an international standard,
"such a measure would embody the international standard completely
and, for practical purposes, converts it into a municipal standard."66 This
language suggests a close fit between a member's domestic regulation
and the international standard but does not state explicitly that there need
be a verbatim reproduction of the international standard. Therefore, the
above language to be read to mean that the function of the two measures
should be similar if not the exact wording.
As stated above, the Codex guidelines call for a risk assessment (and
accompanying safety assessment), risk management, risk communica-
tion, information exchange and a review process.6' The risk assessmentshould be done on a case by case basis and focus only on risks to human
60. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 3(2)-(3), at 21,897.
61. Id. art. 3(2), at 21897. While the SPS Agreement specifically mentions the Codex
Alimentarius Commission as a source of standards, sources are not limited to the list provided
in the SPS Agreement.
62. Id. art. 3(3), at 21,897; see also id. art. 5, at 21,898-99.
63. Id. art. 3(4), at 21,897.
64. See infra § II(B).
65. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3(2), at 21,897.
66. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Jan. 16, 1997, DSR 1998:1 135, 199, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R 170. This case
dealt with an E.C. ban on the placing on the market and importation of meat and meat prod-
ucts which had been treated with certain growth hormones. The U.S. and Canada claimed the
ban violated the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.
67. See infra § II(B).
[Vol. 25:813
The New Codex Alimentarious
health and well-being.68 The initial question is how well the Deliberate
Release Directive match these procedural elements.
Although the stated goals of the Deliberate Release Directive are
prima facie more broad than those contemplated in the Codex guide-
lines, this broader scope of coverage is not dispositive in showing non-
conformity with the Codex guidelines. Whereas the Deliberate Release
Directive seeks to protect "human health and the environment" when
GMOs are released into the environment or placed on the market,6 9 the
Codex guidelines state specifically that it does not cover risk to the envi-
ronment.7° Moreover, SPS Annex A 3(d) provides that, for matters not
covered by the Codex (such as environmental concerns), standards from
other international bodies may be used.7'
In terms of procedural requirements, the Deliberate Release Direc-
tive tracks the Codex guidelines very closely. Like the Codex guidelines,
the Deliberate Release Directive requires an environmental risk assess-
ment (ERA) in the application for permission to release a GMO into the
environment or the market.2 Also like the Codex guidelines, the ERA in
the Deliberate Release Directive bases risk assessment on a comparison
with conventional products and assesses risk on a case by case basis.73
The Deliberate Release Directive requires that the ERA be carried
out in a "scientifically sound ... manner based on available scientific
... data.74 This emphasis in the Deliberate Release Directive on relying
on available scientific data is mirrored in the Codex guidelines which
require that risk assessment "take into account all available scientific
data.75 In addition, the Codex guidelines require the data submitted for
risk assessment to be of a quality "that would withstand scientific peer
review.' '76 This requirement speaks to the soundness of the scientific data.
68. Task Force Report, supra note 19, app. II, 7.
69. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 1, at 4.
70. Task Force Report, supra note 19, app. II, 7.
71. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, annex A(3)(d), at 21,904. In this case, a possible
candidate for an international standard is the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol. See generally
Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1 (assessing the conformity of E.C. GMO regulations with
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety); Duncan Brack et al., The Next Trade War? GM Prod-
ucts, the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO (The Royal Institute of International Affairs
Briefing Paper, Sept. 2003), at http://www.riia.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (discussing
generally GMOs and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety); Ruth Mackenzie et al., An Ex-
planatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (International Union for Conservation
of Nature and Natural Resources (1UCN) Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 46, 2003),
at http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/Biosafety-guide.pdf (last visited July 23,
2004) (providing a general overview of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety).
72. See Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, arts. 5, 12, at 6, 8.
73. Id. art. 4(3), annex Ill(B), at 5, 29-31.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Task Force Report, supra note 19, app. II, T 15 (emphasis added).
76. Id. app. II, 12.
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A similar requirement is found in the Deliberate Release Directive which
mandates that an ERA be carried out "in a scientifically sound... man-
n e r .
7 7
The Deliberate Release Directive also provides for a labeling regime,
as well as a review process for the release of GMOs which would meet
the Codex requirement that risk management be proportional to risk as-
sessment.78 The Deliberate Release Directive also contains provisions
requiring authorities to "consult the public" regarding risks of GMOs, as
well as exchange of information between competent authorities within
the E.C. as well as the Commission.7' These provisions meet the re-
quirements of risk communication and information exchange in the
Codex guidelines which specifically require that the process be "fully
documented at all stages and open to public scrutiny."8° Finally, the De-
liberate Release Directive contains provisions requiring the review of
new information regarding risks to human health.8 These provisions
match closely the Codex guidelines' requirement that safety assessments
should be reviewed in light of new scientific information.82
On the face of the regulations, the Codex guidelines and the Deliber-
ate Release Directive require very similar things in assessing risks
associated with GMOs and therefore seem to seek a similar level of pro-
tection. Indeed, so long as the Appellate Body's interpretation of
"conform to" in Hormones is not taken to mean a verbatim codification
of the international standard, 3 in which case no deviation from the text
would be permitted, the Deliberate Release Directive does sufficiently
"conform to" the Codex guidelines for the purposes of SPS Article 3.2,
thereby enjoying a presumption of compliance with the SPS in general.
However, the specific mention of the Precautionary Principle in the De-
liberate Release Directive, and its conspicuous absence from the text of
the Codex guidelines, does point to a potential difference in the way
these two regimes function. This potential difference, and a determina-
77. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, annex HI(B), at 29-3 1.
78. See id. arts. 4(5), 21, at 5-6, 13; Task Force Report, supra note 19, app. HI, In 16,
19. There is some controversy in terms of references to labeling regimes and "tracing of prod-
ucts" in the Codex guidelines. Many observers think the mention of traceability systems in the
new Codex guidelines is a vindication of the EU's insistence on using labeling and tracing
schemes for GMOs. This perception assumes "traceability" and "tracing of products" are the
same. The U.S. has insisted the two terms are not equivalent. UN Food Standards Body Ap-
proves GMO Regulations, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 1, 2003; see also Brack, supra note 71, at
9; Bridges Trade BioRes, June 27, 2002, at http://www.ictsd.org/biores/02-06-27/story3.htm.
79. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, arts. 9, 10, 11, at 8.
80. Task Force Report, supra note 19 at 45.
81. Id. arts. 8, 20.
82. Task Force Report, supra note 19 at 46.
83. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Jan. 16, 1997, DSR 1998:1 135, 199, WTO Doc. VT/DS26/AB/R 1170.
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tion of how much an embedded precautionary principle can be read into
the Codex guidelines, will be the subject of Part IV.
IV. DOES THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE REQUIRE A
HIGHER LEVEL OF PROTECTION?
So far, this Note has discussed the facially similar elements of the
Deliberate Release Directive and the Codex guidelines. However, as
stated previously, a panel will also examine how a measure actually
functions to determine whether it requires or allows a higher level of
protection than the international standard.s If the Deliberate Release Di-
rective, in function, seeks a higher level of protection than mandated by
the Codex guidelines, then it must comply with the relevant SPS provi-
sions."
One of the primary reasons that the Deliberate Release Directive
could be argued to seek a higher level of protection than the Codex
guidelines is because of the invocation of the Precautionary Principle in
Article 1.86 Nowhere in the Codex guidelines is there mention of the Pre-
cautionary Principle by name. Since a precautionary approach would
allow a higher degree of protection than relying on hard scientific data,
the distinction is important. Although the Codex guidelines make no
mention of the Precautionary Principle, ideas of precaution ma, still be
found within the guidelines. This determination requires a comparison of
the Deliberate Release Directive and the Codex guidelines to determine
if the express invocation of the Precautionary Principle makes the two
instruments function significantly differently to warrant a finding that
the Deliberate Release Directive seeks a higher level of protection than
the Codex guidelines. It is important to point out that, at this level of ex-
amination, it is not necessary to gauge how adjudicatory bodies in the
WTO treat the Precautionary Principle as a norm of international law in
general. This is because the analysis at this stage still focuses only on
how the regulations compare with each other and is not concerned with
any substantive requirements laid out by specific requirements of the
WTO Agreements. 7
84. See infra Section II(A).
85. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(1), at 21,898.
86. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 1, at 4.
87. Of course, this part of the analysis is concerned with Article 3(2) SPS and the re-
quirement that measures "conform to" the international standard but only in as much as it
requires a comparison of the specific measure in question and the international standard. See
SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3(2), at 21,897.
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A. The Precautionary Principle
One of the primary impediments for adequately regulating GMOs is
the lack of scientific knowledge surrounding the risks associated with
GMOs. 8' This lack of knowledge necessitates that measures seeking to
regulate GMOs base risk assessments on other determinations besides
science, to ensure adequate protection when scientific data is not avail-
able. The Precautionary Principle is one tool regulators may use to
justify regulatory measures when scientific data is contradictory or scant.
There is no definitive description of the Precautionary Principle. The
most widely accepted elaboration is Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Decla-
ration: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."'89 While this
definition is limited in scope to environmental degradation (admitting
the scope of such a term is potentially enormous), the Precautionary
Principle has been acknowledged by the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) to also apply to the area of human health protection.9° Based on
these two interpretations, the Precautionary Principle allows that scien-
tific uncertainty should not be used as an excuse to postpone risk
management, whether the risk is to human health or the environment. It
generally can be understood to apply any time there is a potential grave
or irreversible threat to human health or the environment and a risk that
the threat will materialize.9'
B. The Precautionary Principle and the E. C. Measures
With this understanding, the question remains of how does the Pre-
cautionary Principle operate within the confines of the Deliberate
Release Directive specifically? The Deliberate Release Directive is pre-
cautionary on two levels. It is precautionary in that it requires that a risk
assessment of a specific GMO be done prior to release.92 This precau-
tionary step entails scientific analysis of risk.93 In addition, the Deliberate
Release Directive also requires an "assessment of whether the genetic
modification has been characterized sufficiently for the purpose of
88. NANDA & PRING, supra note 45, at 354.
89. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Annex
1, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; IN-
TERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 407 (David Hunter et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
90. Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
213, 219 (2003).
91. Sonia Boutillon, Note, The Precautionary Principle: Development of an Interna-
tional Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 431 (2002).
92. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 367.
93. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, annex II, B, at 19-22.
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evaluating any risks to human health. 94 If a risk assessment is deemed
insufficient (for instance because scientific evidence is not determina-
tive), an E.C. member could take precautionary steps to prevent the
release of the GMO without scientific analysis. The Deliberate Release
Directive requires that E.C. members "in accordance with the precau-
tionary principle, ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid
adverse effects on human health ... which might arise from the deliber-
ate release or the placing on the market of GMOs. 95 This language
suggests that measures deemed appropriate for protecting human health
could be those based on the Precautionary Principle, which by definition
allows less adherence to scientific evidence.
While the Codex guidelines contain both the objectives of protecting
human health and conducting science-based risk assessments, the inclu-
sion of the precautionary language in the Deliberate Release Directive
suggests that an appropriate measure, in accordance with the Precaution-
ary Principle, may not be justified by any existing science but rather by a
lack of scientific evidence. This indicates, prima facie, that the Deliber-
ate Release Directive seeks a higher level of protection than the Codex
guidelines.
C. Ideas of Precaution in the Codex Guidelines
While the Precautionary Principle is not mentioned by name in the
Codex guidelines, ideas of precaution are present. The Precautionary
Principle has been invoked in multiple forms in several international
96agreements involving food safety, the environment, and GMOs. Based
on the prevalence of the Precautionary Principle, or the use of precau-
tionary devices, in international agreements and instruments, one may
argue that the conspicuous absence of the Precautionary Principle from
the Codex guidelines indicates that the drafters did not intend to include
a precautionary device. However, if the Codex guidelines are interpreted
only to be guidelines for assessing risk (as indeed they should be) and
the Precautionary Principle is understood as an administrative measure
used after risk is assessed (as indeed it is), then it makes sense that
the Precautionary Principle would be absent from the actual Codex
94. Id. annex VI(3), at 35.
95. Id. art. 4, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
96. Various examples of international agreements where the Precautionary Principle
itself is named, or ideas of precaution are heavily relied upon include: World Charter for Na-
ture, G.A. Res. 37/7. U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/371L.4 and
Add.1 (1982); Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 I.L.M 1085; Convention on Biological Diversity, June
5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-20 (1993), 31 I.L.M. 818; Vienna Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, at 2.
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guidelines. In addition, absence of an actual invocation of the Precau-
tionary Principle does not preclude the existence of precautionary
elements in the Codex guidelines which would enable a WTO adjudicat-
ing body to read the Precautionary Principle into the text. It is, therefore,
essential to examine which parts of the Codex guidelines may include
ideas of precaution as a means of determining whether the Deliberate
Release Directive really does require a higher level of protection because
of the presence of the Precautionary Principle.
The Codex guidelines state "[r]isk assessment should take into ac-
count all available scientific data and information derived from different
testing procedures, provided that the procedures are scientifically
sound."97 In addition, the pre-market safety assessment should also be
based on sound science that "would withstand scientific peer review."98
This language clearly indicates that a risk assessment should base its
findings on science. However, it does not indicate the findings be based
on a majority opinion. Indeed, the guidelines are explicit that a risk as-
sessment should take into account "all available scientific data and
information derived from different testing procedures." 9 This means that
a minority opinion stating high risk due to lack of scientific understand-
ing could be permissible.
The clearest expression of a precautionary idea in the Codex guide-
lines appears in the risk management section. Paragraph 18 states "[r]isk
managers should take into account the uncertainties identified in the risk
assessment and implement appropriate measures to manage these uncer-
tainties."' ° While this language by no means runs contrary to the
provisions of the guidelines which require that risk assessment be based
on sound science, it does seem to contemplate a situation where uncer-
tainties in a risk assessment, which cannot be assuaged by scientific
review, may be deemed dangerous enough to justify preventing the re-
lease of the specific GMO.
The Codex guidelines also require safety assessments should be re-
viewed when necessary to ensure that emerging scientific information is
incorporated into the risk analysis.' °' Further, when new scientific infor-
mation becomes available, it should be reviewed and "risk management
measures adapted accordingly."'02 This language could be interpreted in
two ways: either as specifically requiring that the latest scientific infor-
mation be used in assessing risk or as implicitly allowing a risk
97. Task Force Report, supra note 19, app. I, 15 (emphasis added).
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assessment to be based on an emerging but minority scientific opinion.
This second interpretation, that risk assessment can be based initially on
minority scientific opinions, necessitates taking into account uncertain-
ties as per Paragraph 18, with the forward looking view that later
scientific discovery may clarify current unknowns about the risks of
GMOs. Viewing the language in this way, it is apparent that some situa-
tions would warrant justifying a non-release on precautionary grounds
exclusively.
Based on this assessment, despite the fact that an explicit invocation
of the Precautionary Principle is absent from the Codex guidelines, the
guidelines do allow the use of precautionary measures when scientific
information is lacking and risk is substantial. Therefore, since, as deter-
mined previously, the Codex guidelines and the Deliberate Release
Directive are facially similar and both contain elements of precaution in
their function, the Deliberate Release Directive does "conform to" the
Codex guidelines and does not seek a higher level of protection. For the
purposes of the SPS Agreement, this would mean a presumption of com-
pliance with the SPS Agreement as well as the GATT. 103
V. THE DELIBERATE RELEASE DIRECTIVE COMPLIES WITH THE
SPS AGREEMENT EVEN IF THEY SEEK A HIGHER LEVEL OF
PROTECTION THAN THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD.
The above assertion that the Deliberate Release Directive conforms
to the Codex guidelines relies on a finding by the panel that elements of
precaution can be read into the Codex guidelines such that the Deliberate
Release Directive does not seek a higher level of protection than the Co-
dex guidelines. However, this may not be the case which leads to the
second assertion of this Note; even if a WTO panel finds that the Delib-
erate Release Directive does seek a higher level of protection than the
Codex guidelines and that it does not sufficiently "conform to" the Co-
dex guidelines to enjoy a presumption of compliance with the SPS
agreement and the GATT, the Deliberate Release directive still complies
with the relevant articles of the SPS Agreement.
The SPS Agreement requires that, if a measure is deemed to seek a
higher level of protection than the relevant international standard de-
mands, it must comply with Article 5 of the SPS."°4 SPS Article 5
generally requires measures be based on a risk assessment, °5 the risk
103. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3(2), at 21,897.
104. Id. art. 5, at 21898-99; see also Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 327 (discuss-
ing the relationship between domestic SPS regulations and international standards).
105. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(1), at 21,898.
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assessment must take into account available scientific evidence,'06 the
member should seek to minimize negative trade effects when determin-
ing the appropriate level of protection, 10 7 and the measure must not be
more trade restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate level of
protection.'08
A. The Measure Must Be Based on a Risk Assessment and May Not
Be Maintained Without Sufficient Scientific
Evidence-SPS Articles 5.1, 5.2 and 2.2
Domestic sanitary and phytosanitary measures which seek a higher
level of protection than that required by an international standard must
generally comply with the procedural requirements in SPS Article 5 and
the substantive requirements in SPS Article 2.2. Articles 5.1 and 5.2 re-
quire that a member base its sanitary and phytosanitary measures on risk
assessment, and that this assessment take into account available scien-
tific evidence.' °9 SPS Article 2.2 requires that a measure itself be based
on scientific principles and may not be maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence."0
The SPS agreement initially requires that a member base its measure
on an assessment of "the risks to human, animal or plant life or
health."" The Appellate Body in Hormones made clear that while a risk
assessment cannot be based merely on "theoretical uncertainty," the SPS
Agreement does not require that a member establish a magnitude of
risk."2 Therefore, a member could in theory seek to reduce ascertainable
risks to zero."'
After determining the existence of risk, the member must conduct a
risk assessment based on scientific principles." 4 "Risk assessment" is
defined in Annex A of the SPS agreement as:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or
spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing
member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures
106. Id. art. 5(2), at 21,898.
107. Id. art. 5(4), at 21,898.
108. Id. art. 5(6), at 21,898.
109. See id. arts. 5(1-2), at 21,898.
110. Howse and Mavroidis have provided an extensive analysis of the general compli-
ance of previous E.C. GMO measures with these requirements of the SPS. However, it is
useful to recount the analysis in light of the fact that Directive 2001/18 effectively repeals
Directive 90/220 by adding new requirements. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1.
111. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(1), at 21,898.
112. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Jan. 16, 1997, DSR 1998:1 135,204-05, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R 186.
113. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 329.
114. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(2), at 21,898.
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which might be applied, and of the associated potential biologi-
cal and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the
potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising
from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs." 5
The Panel in Hormones interpreted this definition as requiring "at
least for risks to human life or health, a scientific examination of data
and factual studies; it is not a policy exercise involving social value
judgments made by political bodies."" 6 However, the Appellate Body in
Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon (Salmon) stated
that it is not necessary for the risk assessment to establish any threshold
degree of risk to justify the SPS measure."7 A risk assessment need not
be quantitative, but may be expressed "quantitatively or qualitatively.""'
The Appellate Body in Salmon developed a three prong test for risk
assessments, determining that a risk assessment must:
(1) identify the disease whose entry, establishment or spread a
member wants to prevent within its territory...
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of
these diseases, as well as the associated potential biological
and economic consequences, and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of
these diseases according to the SPS measures which might be
applied."9
In establishing the above three criteria, the Appellate Body made
clear that a risk assessment cannot simply determine there is a possibility
of entry; the risk assessment must affirmatively determine the likelihood
or probability of entry.
20
Howse and Mavroidis point out that since there is only a qualitative
requirement to the risk assessment, and not a quantitative one, the only
threshold for scientific certainty required by the SPS is the threshold of
not being maintained without "sufficient scientific evidence" contained
115. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, annex A(4), at 21,904
116. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 330 (quoting European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States,
Aug. 18, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/U.S.A 18.94).
117. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Oct. 20, 1998, DSR
1998:VIII 3327, 3362, WTO Doc. WT/DS 18/AB/R 124.
118. Id.
119. Id. T 121.
120. Id. 123.
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in SPS Article 2.2.2 ' This means that regulators could act to prevent se-
rious harm even where a risk assessment is uncertain so long as the
uncertainty was based on sufficient scientific evidence and further ex-
amination was unwarranted due to excessive costs or delay resulting in
irreparable harm. 22
The Principles of Environmental Risk Assessment outlined in Annex
II of the Deliberate Release Directive generally track the requirements
set out in SPS Articles 5.1 and 5.2.123 The overall objective of the ERA is
to evaluate, on a case by case basis, "the potential adverse effects of the
GMO" to identify "if there is a need for risk management and if so, the
appropriate methods to be used."' 24 This language complies with the pro-
cedural requirements laid out in Salmon that a risk assessment identify
the organism, evaluate the likelihood of the spread of the organism (and
associated consequences) and the potential effectiveness of the measure
proposed.125 In addition, the Deliberate Release Directive requires that
the ERA be "carried out in a scientifically sound ... manner based on
available scientific ... data."126 Requiring a sound scientific basis for the
ERA is in keeping with the panel's requirement in Hormones that a risk
assessment necessarily entail a scientific examination of data and factual
studies. 127
However, Article 28 of the Deliberate Release Directive also requires
a scientific committee be consulted when there is an objection raised by
the E.C. member authority or the Commission regarding the risks of
GMOs, when a risk assessment report indicates that a GMO should not
be placed on the market, or at the discretion of the Commission or the
relevant authority of the E.C. member. 128 This framework provides for a
further examination of the scientific justification for an action in almost
every situation where precaution may necessitate denying a release ap-
plication. While Article 28 does not specify exactly what the Scientific
Committee is to find, if they are indeed required to find anything at all
regarding the risk assessment, this extra step does seem to address the
requirements or SPS Article 2.2.29 In addition, consultation of the Scien-
121. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 362; see also Salmon, DSR 1998:VIII at
3365, WTO Doc. WT/DS 18/AB/R 130.
122. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 362.
123. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 363.
124. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, annex II(A), at 19.
125. Salmon, DSR 1998:VII at 3361, WTO Doc. WT/DSI8/AB/R T 121.
126. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, annex H.
127. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Complaint by the United States, Aug. 18, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/U.S.A
8.94.
128. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 28, at 14-15.
129. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 363.
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tific Committee provides further assurance that the three prong test out-
lined in Salmon is applied as thoroughly as possible, relying on
precaution only in situations where further information is truly unavail-
able.30
B. Members Should Minimize Negative Trade Effects and
Measures Should Not Be More Trade Restrictive
Than Necessary-Arts. 5.4 and 5.6 SPS
Article 5.6 SPS requires generally that a member's measures are not
more trade restrictive than required to provide the "appropriate level of
sanitary and phytosanitary protection."'' In determining this level of pro-
tection, under SPS Article 5.4, a member must "take into account the
objective of minimizing negative trade effects."'32
The Appellate Body in Salmon noted that the footnote to SPS Article
5.6 creates a three part test for ensuring that a measure is no more trade-
restrictive than required.'33 A measure is considered more trade-
restrictive than required if there is another measure which: is "reasona-
bly available taking into account technical and economic feasibility,"
"achieves the appropriate level of sanitary ... protection"; and is "sig-
nificantly less restrictive to trade" than the sanitary measure contested.' 34
The Salmon test does not examine the member's chosen level of pro-
tection. Indeed, a WTO adjudicating body will not question the level of
the objective sought; they will review the means and not the ends of a
measure. 15 However, the Panel in Japan-Measures Affecting Agricul-
tural Products ("Varietals Panel") determined that Article 5.6 of the SPS
agreement must be read in the context of Article 2.2; namely that the
measure is applied only to the extent "necessary to protect human ...
life or health."' 3 6 The Varietals Panel indicated that an adjudicating body
may examine a member's ends, and if a measure was over protective of
human health, it would be deemed more trade restrictive than required.'
37
Therefore, a test for compliance with SPS Article 5.6 would characterize
a member's appropriate level of protection, deem whether that level is
necessary to protect human life or health, and assess what other
130. See Salmon, DSR 1998:VIII at 3365, WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R 130.
131. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(6), at 21,898.
132. Id. art. 5(4), at 21898.
133. See id. art. 5(6), at 21898 n.3.
134. Salmon, DSR 1998:VIII at 3379, WTO Doc. WT/DS 18/AB/R 180.
135. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 337.
136. Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Oct. 27, 1998, DSR 1999:1 315,
453, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R, 8.71; see also Salmon, DSR 1998:VIII at 3379, WTO Doc.
WT/DS 18/AB/R T 180.
137. Id.
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measures which are less trade restrictive may be reasonably available
based on this level of protection.
In terms of the level of protection sought by the Deliberate Release
Directive, safety of a GM product is determined relative to its conven-
tional counterpart. In essence, this means that any margin of risk beyond
that posed by the non-genetically modified equivalent could potentially
be deemed inadequate. 3 8 This regime establishes a baseline (the safety of
the conventional counterpart) which is, by its nature, minimally trade
restrictive since the safety of a conventional counterpart is already an
accepted norm in the market which trading partners can be reasonably
excepted to meet. 39 In addition, scientific committees could demonstrate
the level of protection is necessary to protect human health. This would
address the requirement outlined in Varietals that a measure not be over
protective of human health. 4°
The fast track procedures outlined in Article 7 of the Deliberate Re-
lease Directive could address the requirement that the measure "take into
account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects" if it indeed
can be shown that sufficient experience with a GMO has lead to a con-
clusion that it is safe for human consumption. 4' However, Article 7 could
be little more than window dressing for all but the most well known and
widely used products.
An important question relating to Article 7 of the Deliberate Release
Directive is the source of the experience with the GMO. Article 7 re-
quires interactions with the sending and receiving environments.'4 2 This
could limit trading partners' market access. A member desiring to export
a specific GMO to the E.C. could have substantial experience with that
GMO in its own country but be denied the fast track process because it
has no information regarding interactions with an E.C. environment.' 43 If
an exporting member in this situation were still required to go through
the E.C.'s standard regulatory approval process, instead of the fast track
approval process, this could be considered more trade restrictive than
necessary, in light of the fact that the particular GMO is safe for use in
the exporting country. While it is difficult to determine in the abstract
how advantageous differentiated procedures would be, it is clear that
having a number of different methods for approving GMOs, each with
varying requirements, goes a longer way towards compliance with SPS
Articles 5.6 and 5.4.
138. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 364.
139. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 364.
140. Japan Measures, DSR 1999:1 at 453, WTO Doc. V/T/DS76/R, 8.71.
141. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(4), at 21,898.
142. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, annex V(2), at 34.
143. See id.
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C. Checking Compliance With A Measure Must Be
Done Without Undue Delay- SPS Article 8
Another aspect of the Deliberate Release Directive which will be of
crucial importance to a WTO panel is the "moratorium" on approval of
all GMO products seeking admission into the E.C.. The U.S. complaint
centers on the E.C. suspension of applications for and approval of bio-
tech products under the E.C. system as well as national marketing and
import bans on biotech products of E.C. member states.'"
SPS Article 8 and Annex C require that approval procedures be un-
dertaken and completed "without undue delay.' '145 The Appellate Body in
Hormones established that SPS Article 2.3, which requires that mem-
ber's measures not constitute a disguised restriction on trade 46 , provides
context for reading other SPS articles.4 4 Therefore, if a member were to
violate Article 8 in terms of causing an undue delay in the approval
process, this would also be a violation of Article 2.3. It is important to
consider, in assessing compliance with SPS Articles 8 and 2.3, whether
the moratorium is outside the scope of the Deliberate Release Directive
or is considered legal within the scope of the framework.
With respect to E.C. member states' individual regulations, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) recently held that an E.C. member state
may suspend the trade in GMOs within its territory if, as a result of new
information or a reassessment of existing information, the product en-
dangers human health.'4 8 This case dealt with Italy's suspension of the
use of transgenic maize manufactured by Monsanto, which Monsanto
claimed should have been allowed under the fast track provisions in Ar-
ticle 5 Novel Foods. 49 The court found that Article 5 Novel Foods did
not prevent a member from implementing measures under Article 12
Novel Foods, which generally provides that when new or additional
144. European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Bio-
tech Products, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Aug. 8, 2003,
WTO Doc. WT/DS291/23 at 1.
145. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8, annex C(l)(a), at 21,899, 21,908.
146. Id. art. 2(3), at 21,897.
147. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Jan. 16, 1997, DSR 1998:1 135, 216, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R 212. In this
case the Appellate Body was establishing specifically that SPS Article 5.5 should be read in
the context of the more general requirements of SPS Article 2(3): "When read together with
Article 2.3, Article 5.5 may be seen to be marking out and elaborating a particular route lead-
ing to the same destination set out in Article 2.3." Id.
148. See Case 236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA & Others v. Presidenza del
Consiglio dei Ministri & Others, 2003 E.C.R. (forthcoming), at http://europa.eu.int/
smartapi/cgi/sga.doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=62001J0236.
149. Specifically Bt-1 1, MON 810 and MON 809. Recently, the E.C. has granted Mon-
santo Roundup Ready Corn (GA-21) approval for release into the E.C., infra
Section flI(C)(iv).
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information regarding food safety indicates a danger to human health, a
member may temporarily restrict or suspend trade or use of a product.'50
[Tihose measures can be adopted only if the member State has first
carried out a risk assessment which is as complete as possible given the
particular circumstances of the individual case, from which it is apparent
that, in the light of the precautionary principle, the implementation of
such measures is necessary in order to ensure that novel foods do not
present a danger for the consumer."'
The Deliberate Release Directive also contains a safeguard provision
with language that mirrors Article 12 of Novel Foods almost exactly.
Therefore, even though the ECJ did not consider the Deliberate Release
Directive, it is reasonable to assess both measures' compliance with SPS
Article 8 together.
The U.S. included the Italian suspension of Monsanto maize in its
WTO complaint. However, in terms of compliance with the SPS agree-
ment, the question for the WTO panel will not be one of substantial
equivalence (as it was for the ECJ in the Italian Case), but whether the
indefinite suspension of GM maize could be considered an undue delay
under SPS Article 8 and a disguised restriction on trade under SPS Arti-
cle 2.3.
The ECJ decision in the Italian Case indicates that suspensions of
approval of GMOs are legal within the E.C. regulations. In addition,
since the fast track procedures outlined in Article 5 Novel Foods do not
affect a state's ability to implement safeguards under Article 12 Novel
Foods, the decision also indicates that safeguards fall outside of the
scope of procedural approval requirements in Novel Foods. While this
decision is certainly not binding on a WTO panel, it could be instructive
in determining whether the provisional measures in Article 12 Novel
Foods, as well as those in Article 23 of the Deliberate Release Directive,
are outside the scope of the procedural requirements under SPS Article
8.153
Using the ECJ's ruling as a basis, the E.C. moratorium would not be
considered a procedural violation under SPS Article 8 since any suspen-
sion of the approval process would be outside the normal scope of the
normal approval process. A provisional measure such as a moratorium is
more appropriately considered under SPS Article 5.7.
150. Council Regulation 258/97 on Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, art. 1,
1997 O.J. (L 43) 1, 1-6 [hereinafter Novel Foods].
151. Case 236/01, supra note 148.
152. See Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 23, at 13.
153. See generally India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical And Agricultural
Chemical Products, Dec. 19, 1997, DSR 1998:1 9, 30-31, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R 66
(discussing the application of domestic decisions to VTO rulings).
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D. Measures Adopted on Precaution-SPS Article 5.7
SPS Article 5.7 allows a member to provisionally adopt sanitary
measures in cases where scientific evidence is insufficient.14 While gen-
erally, SPS Article 2.2 prevents a member from implementing measures
without scientific justification, SPS Article 5.7 operates as a qualified
exemption from obligations under SPS Article 2.2. ' However, SPS Arti-
cle 5.7 does not override the requirements of SPS Articles 5.1 and 5.2.156
Therefore, while a member does not have to base a provisional measure
on scientific principles, nor maintain it with scientific evidence (as re-
quired by SPS Article 2.2), it still must base the measure on a risk
assessment which takes into account available scientific evidence (as
required by SPS Articles 5.1 and 5.2).
In this vein, the Appellate Body in Varietals determined that the two
sentences of SPS Article 5.7 read together constitute a four part test.
57
First, the relevant scientific information must be insufficient.' Second,
the measure must be adopted on the basis of available pertinent informa-
tion.9 Third, the member must seek to obtain additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk."W This information
must be "germane to conducting ... a risk assessment."'6 ' Finally, the
member must seek to review the measure within a reasonable period of
time.16 This period of time is established on a case by case basis.' 63 If
any one of these four requirements is not met, a measure is not consis-
tent with Article 5.7.164
The Appellate Body did not illuminate the meaning of "available
pertinent information." This term is potentially the most important in
SPS Article 5.7, however, in terms of understanding how much informa-
tion is enough to justify a precautionary measure.61
Howse and Mavroidis point out that the Deliberate Release Directive
is precautionary in the sense that the it takes a precautionary approach by
not approving a GMO until it is shown to be safe. 166 This implies a
154. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(7), at 21,898.
155. See Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Oct. 27, 1998, DSR 1999:1
277, 296, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R 80.
156. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), Jan. 16,1997, DSR 1998:J 135, 181, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R T 125.




161. Id. DSR 1999:1 at 298-99, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R 92.
162. Id. DSR 1999:1 at 298, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R 89.
163. Id. DSR 1999:1 at 299, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R 93.
164. Id. DSR 1999:1 at 298, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R [89.
165. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 343.
166. Id. at 367.
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reliance on a scientific determination of safety (or lack thereof). How-
ever, SPS Article 5.7 only requires that a member's risk assessment take
into account scientific evidence, not base a decision on scientific evi-
dence. 67 Therefore, the E.C. could invoke SPS Article 5.7 if a
provisional measure was put in place because a "genetic modification
has [not] been characterized sufficiently for the purpose of evaluating
any risks to human health" as required by the Deliberate Release Direc-
tive. 161
The current moratorium seems to be exactly this kind of situation.
For reasons which are not sufficiently supported by available science, the
E.C. and its member states have chosen to suspend trade in certain
GMOs because they have not been sufficiently characterized in terms of
human safety.
69
In applying the four part test from Varietals, the first two parts are
clearly met. The scientific information in this case is insufficient to es-
tablish a hard line of acceptable risk and the measure is being adopted on
the basis of the information which is available. In regards to the third
part, that the member must seek additional information necessary for a
more objective assessment, Howse and Mavroidis point out that in the
old measure, Directive 90/220/EEC, there was only a duty to seek new
information in situations where the GMO was approved.'70 Howse and
Mavroidis make the argument, however, that in denying an application,
an applicant can always reapply with new information and so in a sense
the third prong of SPS Article 5.7 is met.' 7' Expanding upon Howse and
Marvroidis' reasoning, this is true when there is nothing to prejudice re-
application (as there is not of the face of the Deliberate Release
Directive). However, in a situation such as the current one, in which a
moratorium may prejudice reapplication, or a requirement to collect new
information may be seen as a disguised barrier to trade, it is not so clear
that the third prong is met.
The third prong may be met however by the requirement under the
Deliberate Release Directive to consult a scientific committee in situa-
tions where an application has been refused. 72 Part of the Scientific
Committee's charge is to "draw the Commission's attention to any spe-
cific or emerging problem falling within their remit in matters of ...
167. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5(7), at 21,898.
168. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 368 (quoting Directive 90/220).
169. Indeed, the Scientific Committee on Plants found many of the temporary bans insti-
tuted by E.C. member states under article 16 of Council Directive unjustified based on
scientific evidence. See Facts on GMOs in the EU, supra note 6 at 4.
170. Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 368.
171. Id. at 369.
172. See Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 28, at 14-15.
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food safety."'73 This examination by the Scientific Committee seeks new
information as per the third prong of the Varietals test.174 However, the
language of Article 28 of the Deliberate Release Directive indicates that
a Scientific Committee is consulted in a situation where permission is
refused, not where permission is stayed. 75 Therefore, the Deliberate Re-
lease Directive does not seem to fulfill the third prong of the test.
However, even though the E.C. has suspended applications and deci-
sions, investigation into risk assessment continues. Just recently the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) issued a favorable scientific
opinion on Monsanto's NK603 Roundup Ready Maize, one of the prod-
ucts listed in the U.S. complaint. 76 This determination by the EFSA was
the last step before final approval under the Deliberate Release Direc-
tive. 7  Therefore, while the process may be moving slowly (the pace of
the review would then be the fourth consideration of the Varietals test), it
is by no means stagnant."
E. One Final Consideration-GAT Article XX
If the moratorium cannot be justified in terms of scientific assess-
ment of risk, the most appropriate instrument for review of legality under
WTO may be GATI' Article 111.4. 79 GATT Article 111.4 forbids members
from giving less favorable treatment to products which are considered
the same or directly competitive. The difficult determination in this
situation would be likeness. The Appellate Body, in E.C.-Measures Af-
fecting Asbestos And Asbestos Containing Products ("Asbestos") found
"likeness" can be determined using physical properties, end uses, con-
sumer perceptions and tariff classification, but other considerations are
173. Commission Decision 97/579/E.C. of 23 July 1997 Setting Up Scientific Commit-
tees in the Field of Consumer Health and Safety (Text with EEA relevance), Art. 2.4, O.J. (L
237) 18-23.
174. Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Oct. 27, 1998, DSR 1999:1 277,
298, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/AB/R T 89.
175. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 28, at 14-15.
176. Monsanto Press Release, European Food Safety Authority Issues Favorable Scien-
tific Opinion on Monsanto's Roundup Ready Corn Technology (Dec. 5, 2003), at
http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/layout/media/03/12-05-03.asp [hereinafter Monsanto
Press Release]; European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Aug. 8, 2003,
WTO Doc. WT/DS291/23 at 7.
177. See Monsanto Press Release, supra note 176.
178. See Marc L. Busch & Robert Howse, A (Genetically Modified) Food Fight, Can-
ada's WTO Challenge to Europe's Ban on GM Products, (C.D. Howe Institute Commentary,
Sept. 2003), at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary-186.pdf (assessing the timeliness of
the WTO challenge).
179. GATT, supra note 4, art. 111(4), 55 U.N.T.S. at 206.
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not outside the scope of GATT Article 111.4."8 ° The Asbestos opinion used
consumer perceptions to justify differentiating products in terms of
health risks or perceived health risks. In the same way, GMOs may be
determined to be different from conventional products because of the
public perception of the dangers of GMOs.
However, if the Deliberate Release Directive is deemed to be incon-
sistent with GATT Article 111.4, they could still be justified either under
GATT Article XX(a) or (b), exemptions for public morals or protecting
human health. The Deliberate Release Directive provides for a consulta-
tion of a Committee on Ethics where issues on the ethical implications of
biotechnology arise.'8 ' This would provide a basis either for determining
unlikeness of products or justifying the moratorium under GAT Article
XX(a). 182
The moratorium may also be justifiable under subparagraph (b) or
GATT Article XX which allows members to violate GATT Article III if
it is necessary to protect human health.' The Appellate Body in Asbes-
tos determined that a member, in justifying a measure under GATT
Article XX(b), may rely on scientific sources which represent a diver-
gent opinion.'4 In addition, the Appellate Body also stated that a panel
need not rely on the preponderant weight of the evidence to deem an
action is justifiable under GATT Article XX(b). This indicates that an
action could potentially be based on a minority scientific opinion which
advocated for precaution but could only back up that opinion with a lack
of clear evidence of safety.
The Appellate Body also made clear that the term "necessary"
means there is no less trade restrictive measure available.-' If the E.C.
can show via a scientific opinion, potentially from a Scientific Commit-
tee, that there is a potential risk in the future from GMOs, then the
moratorium could be considered the least trade restrictive means of pro-
tecting human health.
180. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos And Asbestos Containing
Products, March 12, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R 102.
181. Directive 2001/18, supra note 9, art. 29, at 14-15.
182. See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 1, at 370. At this point, the Public Morals ex-
ception in Article XX(a) GATT has not been interpreted in WTO adjudication, so it is not
clear how the "necessity" requirement would be met.
183. See GATT, supra note 4, art. XX(b), 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
184. Asbestos, V/TO Doc. WT/DS 135/AB/R 178.
185. Id. 171.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current GMO dispute is one of the WTO's greatest adjudicating
challenges to date. From a legal standpoint, multiple levels of legal
framework within the WTO as well as in the E.C. risk turning the adju-
dication process into a morass. From a societal standpoint, the challenge
is greater. This dispute is more politically charged than Shrimp Turtle,
which to date has been the WTO's highest profile case.'86 While the legal
regime may advise a specific outcome, going counter to the will of either
the United States or the E.C. risks putting into question the legitimacy of
the entire WTO.
The new Codex guidelines are a small part of the overall dispute, but
since they represent the baseline by which the E.C. may judge the risks
of GMOs, the guidelines are a critical element. The new Codex guide-
lines provide a procedural framework for regulators to assess the risks
associated with foods derived from biotechnology. In as much as the De-
liberate Release Directive currently being challenged in the WTO is also
a procedural framework for E.C. member states to create domestic regu-
latory policy for managing risks associated with GMOs, the directive
clearly conforms to the international standard as required in SPS Article
3.2.117 In addition, even though the Deliberate Release Directive bases its
implementation on the Precautionary Principle, the directives does not
seek a higher level of protection than sought in the Codex guidelines as
elements of precaution are included in them as well.
Even if the Deliberate Release Directive is deemed to be more pro-
tective than the Codex guidelines, and therefore does not enjoy the
presumption of compliance granted by SPS Article 3.2, it is more than
likely that it will be found to comply with SPS Article 5. In addition, the
moratorium could be considered a provisional measure under SPS Arti-
cle 5.7 if it can be shown that as part of the application process, there is
an ongoing examination of the potential safety of the GMO. Indeed, the
recent permission granted to Mansanto Roundup Ready maize indicates
this to be the case.
186. See generally United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Oct. 12, 1998, DSR 1998:VII 2755, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Appellate Body
report); United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, May 15,
1998, DSR 1998:VI 2821, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (Panel report). Shrimp Turtle dealt with the
United State's requirement that imported shrimp be caught with turtle exclusion devices
(TEDs) which ensured that sea turtles were not harmed in shrimp harvests. Shrimp Turtle,
supra.
187. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3(2), at 21,896.
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